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Practicing Practicing 
Ladelle McWhorter 
"There is something ludicrous in philosophical discourse," Michel Foucault 
writes, "when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them 
where their truth is and how to find it ... " (Foucault 1985, 9). In our age of 
moral relativism and multiculturalism, it is easy to hear in this sentence a 
simple condemnation of intellectuals who pose as authorities on questions 
of belief, and it is all too easy to agree; yes, of course, we ought not tell other 
people what to think. But given the issues, directions, and investments of 
Foucault's work, especially in The Use of Pleasure where this passage is to be 
found, I think this sort of soft relativistic reading of him is a great oversim-
plification, if not a total error. As I see it, Foucault's statement is not so much 
a disparagement of authority and authoritative pronouncement as it is a 
gesture toward a philosophical reorientation; Foucault is developing anal-
ternative conception of what philosophical work might be. Within this re-
orienting movement, authority ceases to be of very much concern, not be-
cause one comes to the realization that there are no authorities (there may 
well be) but because one ceases to be primarily concerned with pronounce-
ment; that is, the formulation of true propositions is no longer one's pri-
mary philosophical goal. And once one ceases to focus one's energy ones-
tablishing the truth of propositions, one is no longer likely to spend much 
time dictating to others which propositions they should hold true. 
In his last years Foucault became very interested in the Hellenistic period, 
a time when philosophy was less concerned with doctrine and more con-
cerned with developing, as Pierre Hadot has put it, "a way of life." Hadot, 
whose work was extremely important to Foucault, 1 offers Stoicism as an ex-
ample of this widespread Hellenistic view: "The Stoics, for instance, declared 
explicitly that philosophy, for them, was an 'exercise.' In their view, philos-
ophy did not consist in teaching an abstract theory-much less in the exe-
gesis of texts-but rather in the art of living. It is a concrete attitude and a 
determinate lifestyle, which engages the whole of existence. The philo-
sophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the 
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self and of being. It is a progress which causes us to be more fully, and makes 
us better" (Hadot 1995, 82-83).2 To illustrate this point, Hadot cites Seneca 
("Philosophy teaches us how to act, not how to talk"), Epictetus ("spiritual 
progress does not consist in learning to explain Chrysippus better, but in 
transforming one's own freedom"; "the subject-matter of the art of living 
[i.e., philosophy] is the life of every individual"), and Plutarch ("since phi-
losophy is the art of living, it should not be kept apart from any pastime") 
(1995, no; notes 9, 10, and n).It is from these texts and others from the Hel-
lenistic period that Foucault takes his notion that lives can be works of art 
and that philosophical practice can be part of an ethos, a way of living. 
Like Foucault, although without benefit ofHadot's work until recently, 
I have come increasingly over the years to view and to experience philos-
ophy as a kind of self-forming activity. The point of philosophical endeavor 
is not to establish a body of cosmological or moral propositions that we 
might believe in or adhere to and that we might reasonably expect others 
to believe in or adhere to as well. Philosophy is not pursuit of truth. Phi-
losophy is pursuit of wisdom. Truth, as Agent Mulder often claims, may 
well be out there, awaiting us like an as yet unidentified object just over the 
horizon. But wisdom's residence is never out there; if wisdom comes into 
view at all, its site of emergence will be here-with, through, and as the un-
folding of my life, or your life, or the life of someone else. Whereas truth 
may occur as the timeless relationship between a proposition and a state 
of affairs, wisdom occurs as the temporal unfolding of human thought in 
practice. This is what Hellenistic philosophers such as the Stoics and Epi-
cureans and Cynics seem to have believed. This is what I think Foucault 
came to believe. At any rate, it is what I believe. 
But, if I am to be a philosopher, this presents me with a problem. The 
principal activity of philosophers in our time is the production of essays, 
like the one I am writing now. And essays-as fostered, encouraged, or even 
demanded by academic institutions-are usually construed as tools of trans-
mission, a kind of intellectual transportation; essays are the vehicles in which 
our truths ride from one mind to another. Thus, philosophical practice in 
the present day is reduced to truth-acquisition followed by report-writing. 
The process by which one acquires the truths to be inserted into the vehi-
cle is not at issue (unless one is accused of plagiarism); the point is to get 
into possession of some truths and to construct a vehicle adequate to bear 
them to their destination, "the audience." But what does any of that have 
to do with cultivating oneself as a site for the emergence of wisdom? 
I'm not terribly sure. So the temptation, which I'm certain is not pecu-
liar to me, is to set that question aside and just get on with the business of 
constructing intellectual vehicles for the small stock of ideas that one has 
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already managed to amass,3 or to undertake a frantic search for a new idea, 
a new truth that can be manufactured, packaged, and launched into the 
world by the editor's deadline, without regard to what effect that frantic 
process might have on the writer. It is very easy to succumb to this temp-
tation without even realizing it, especially when living at the hectic pace 
that most of us maintain during the academic year. I have to admit that it 
is exactly what I did when I started working on this essay. 
From the beginning of the project, I knew what I wanted to write about: 
the differences between feminist practices of woman-affirmation and Fou-
cauldian care of the self, which might be construed as practices of self-
affirmation. I wanted to say that even for someone who is a woman and 
comfortably identifies that way, woman-affirming practices may be posi-
tively antithetical to caring for one's self. (This is because feminist prac-
tices of woman-affirmation often make assumptions about the nature of 
selfhood that I believe are both mistaken and dangerous, especially for peo-
ple who are oppressed. Foucault's conception of selfhood and descriptions 
of self-cultivating practices are less likely to support patterns of oppression 
that currently exist. But more about this later.) I also had what I thought 
were some pretty good ideas about how to illustrate those differences. Nev-
ertheless, I seemed unable to settle into a consistent tone or style of writ-
ing, no matter how hard I worked at it. The essay just never sounded right 
to my ear. 
At first it seemed that my problem was that I didn't know who I was writ-
ing for. Who was my audience for this explanatory exercise? Was it feminists 
interested in but not knowledgeable about Foucault, feminists hostile to Fou-
cault, feminists already convinced by Foucault, nonfeminist Foucauldians? 
Who? How I styled the essay depended on which of these groups I wanted 
my message to reach. After all, essays are means of transmission. How I built 
my verbal vehicle depended on which audience I wanted my little truth trans-
ported to. But after weeks of struggle over the question of audience identity, 
I finally recognized that my problem was not in fact the lack of a clear sense 
of audience to which to present my thesis; it was the pernicious presence of 
a need to designate an audience for what supposedly was a philosophical ex-
ercise of self-transformation. I was focused on others when I should have 
been focused on myself. Furthermore, I had to ask myself, why did I want to 
explore the differences between feminist woman-affirming practices and 
Foucauldian care of the self? So that I could tell those feminists what they 
were doing wrong? So that I could enlighten some Foucault scholars about 
feminist practice? So that I could presume to tell those other people what to 
think? What would be the value in that, in relation to wisdom, even if I were 
in possession of some extraordinary truth? I began to worry that I didn't 
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have a message after all. No message, no audience. Ultimately that seemed to 
equal no essay. 
But, I realized, what I did have was a very real (in fact a fast-growing) con-
cern. Something was gnawing at me. And that was a place to start. For the 
sake of the essay, if for no other reason, I needed to pay close attention to 
the nature and context of my own concern; I needed to take care of my self. 
So I started all over again. The important thing to focus on, I decided, 
was the tension I feel between feminist practices of woman-affirmation and 
practices associated with a Foucauldian conception of care of the self. I'm 
attracted to practices of woman-affirmation, especially to those that in-
volve revaluation of natural cycles, carnality, and the earth. Something im-
portant offers itself in those movements, and yet I feel that they endanger 
me in ways that Foucault's work warns me about and makes me sensitive 
to. I decided that if I paid attention to the uneasiness I feel when I try to 
situate myself in relation to both of these discursive practices simultane-
ously (which was the theme of the anthology, anyway, right?), maybe some-
thing unforeseen would happen. Who knows? Maybe I could even find a 
way to practice philosophy while still fulfilling the requirements of my ac-
ademic job. Imagine that! So I turned my attention to feminist practices 
that have spoken niost meaningfully to me over the last twenty-five years, 
namely, those that involve how I live with, through, and as my body. 
Feminists nowadays write a lot about "the body," thereby acknowledg-
ing the importance of corporeal issues in our intellectual pursuits, but we 
don't often acknowledge straightforwardly how difficult it was to live life 
as a female body before our encounters with early radical feminist reinter-
pretations of female bodily existence. Simone de Beauvoir's inventory of 
masculine supremacist invective against female bodies in The Second Sex 
accurately portrays what many of us lived with-ubiquitous images of our 
bodies (which were already ourselves) as obtrusive, ugly, filthy, stinking, ir-
rational, and inherendy diseased. Beauvoir herself suggests that this con-
struction of the female body is historical and therefore optional. The rad-
ical feminists of the late 1960s and early 1970s took her suggestion very 
seriously and began to critique the construct of femininity that produced 
and reinforced such degraded bodily existences. Alice Embree's analysis of 
Madison Avenue strategies to create and sustain feminine consumers and 
Naomi Weisstein's critique of contemporary psychological theories, both 
of which appeared in the 1970 publication Sisterhood Is Powerful, are cases 
in point, and they are only two of scores of articles that appeared around 
the same time. 4 Women believed we were stinking and filthy because profit-
makers told us so through every medium available. We believed we were 
irrational and incompetent because professionals told us through every so-
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cial institution in existence. Feminists told and showed us, however, that 
these messages were motivated politically and economically. They were not 
truths to be accepted despite humiliation and pain; they were propaganda 
to be resisted and opposed. 
Feminist exposes and reinterpretations made it possible to imagine a cul-
ture in which female bodies would be celebrated and valued rather than 
denigrated, because they made it possible to believe that the denigration of 
our female bodies in this culture was a political rather than a biological fact, 
a matter of power arrangements rather than nature. As I read the words of 
feminist anthropologists, historians, poets, cultural critics, theologians, and 
others, I began to look at my body differently, to see potentials not seen be-
fore, and to feel different inside (and as) my skin. The practice of reading, 
discussing what I read with friends, and seeking out more feminist writings 
to read, was positively life-transforming for me and for many other women 
my age and older. It helped me realize that the body my culture had handed 
me was not the only one I might have and that with time and effort my cor-
poreal existence could be otherwise, even radically otherwise. 
This move toward the otherwise was no mere intellectual leap, no sim-
ple rational rejection of a false ideology soon replaced by the truth. This 
transformation was not something that took place just inside my head. 
Feminist writing that critiqued and reinterpreted bodily existence invited 
me and summoned me to conduct myself, as a bodily being, differently. As 
I saw new conceptual possibilities, I enacted new behavioral possibilities 
and then saw new conceptual possibilities in turn. Not just my thinking, 
but my whole compartmental ensemble changed. 
And it didn't stop there. Through the 1980s feminists made connections 
between the denigration of female bodies that is still rife in our culture and 
the misuse and abuse of other beings. It became clear that our culture's dis-
gust with and exploitation of female bodies is just one part of a much larger 
picture that includes refusal of human mortality and denial of our de-
pendence upon nature. Along with writers such as Susan Griffin, Vandana 
Shiva, Y nestra King, and Star hawk, I too found that as my ways of thinking 
about and of being a female body began to shift away from the dualistic, 
quasi-Cartesian, masculine supremacist ways I had thought and lived be-
fore, I needed and wanted to develop and engage in new practices regard-
ing aging, mortality, and ecological cycles. I couldn't just be a feminist. I had 
to be something like an eco-feminist. And this shift involved much more 
than just adoption of a new set of doctrines; it involved-it primarily con-
sisted of-the practice of a new set of actions. I didn't just read Star hawk; 
I gardened and com posted and contributed money to environmental lobby 
groups and educated myself about environmental issues and policies and 
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drove a pick-up route for a recycling co-op. And I saw these things as di-
rectly and intimately related to my feminist practices. Once again, I was re-
thinking bodily existence-with and through my body. 
Maybe that was how I started rethinking philosophy as a way oflife. I'm 
not sure, but it was during that same period of time that I came to be con-
sciously open to the import of Plutarch's words: "since philosophy is the 
art of living, it should not be kept apart from any pastime." It was about 
this time in my life that I became deeply aware of the need to think of phi-
losophy not as mere intellectual exercise, as a mind/body dualist might have 
it, but as physical, material practice. With my changing, materially, eco-
logically thoughtful comportment, I was becoming a living critique of (al-
beit still a site of ongoing struggle with) Western metaphysical dualism. If 
one of the major philosophical issues of the twentieth century was the at-
tempt to dismantle and move beyond metaphysics in general and dualism 
in particular, then I was twentieth-century Western philosophy incarnate. 
I think many of us feminists, particularly eco-feminists, were. 
Throughout that long period in my life, then, feminist practices were very 
important for me. They focused and helped me focus on overcoming tra-
ditional-crippling-conceptions of female bodies and restructuring my 
bodily comportment; in doing so they helped me connect myself in new 
and positive ways with the other living beings and systems on our living 
planet; and all of this involved extensive engagement with other feminists 
in bodily practices such that I could not forget that even the seemingly most 
otherworldly, most abstract of intellectual pursuits is truly corporeal, ma-
terial, and dependent upon the organic interconnections that make up our 
earth. Over the past twenty years, feminist practices have made me who I 
am; they have given me my self. And it is a much better, healthier, more beau-
tiful self than it would have been had feminism never come to exist. Yet I 
am deeply suspicious of many feminist woman-affirming practices, even 
while I am so attracted (and so indebted) to them. My suspicions are painful 
to me; I want to avoid them. But as a philosopher, I find I just can't. 
The effort to rid ourselves of the oppressive bodily comportments and 
self-images that patriarchal society constructed for us was in many respects 
a necessarily creative enterprise. In the process of rejecting that feminin-
ity, we had to imagine and build new ways to act, to see ourselves, and to 
relate to others and the world around us. We had to become other than 
what we had been; we had to invent ourselves. Had we just done that-had 
we just opened ourselves to possibility and experimentation-who knows 
what might have happened? What would women have become if we had 
simply dismantled 196os-style femininity and female sex roles and em-
braced the unknown? But we didn't. Historian Alice Echols says that by 
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1975-and in some groups such as Boston's Cell16 as early as 1970-radi-
cal feminism was in decline and was being replaced on the narrowly de-
fined political front by liberal feminism and on every other front by cul-
tural feminism.5 For a variety of reasons, some of the same feminists who 
had been trying to destroy static images of femaleness began trying to con-
struct an alternative image-an image they claimed did what the patriar-
chal images had failed to do: It captured the truth of womanhood. 
Since that door began to open just before 1970-that door that was an 
exit from a patriarchically constructed female essence-feminists have ag-
onized over the question of the truth of womanhood. Radical feminism's 
own analyses seemed to point to an absence of such a truth outside patri-
archy (as well as, of course, an absence of actual truth within it). But if ab-
sence there were, then to step through that door would be to step out of 
womanhood altogether and, hence, to run the risk of scattering, of be-
coming so other that unity would be impossible and newfound feminist 
solidarity and support would be jeopardized and quite possibly lost. If fem-
inism as an organized movement was to continue to exist, the door could 
not be merely an exit. It had to be a portal to something real and substan-
tial enough to hold together, to hold us together, and to give us something 
to affirm. 
This concern about the loss of unity and the belief it gave rise to-that 
there is a nonpatriarchal truth of womanhood-was subterranean in some 
of the work of the early cultural feminist and eco-feminist movements. And 
so it was possible, especially for those of us who still desperately needed 
the communities and practices that would help us resist the ever-evolving 
patriarchal images of femaleness that assailed and pervaded us, to ignore 
the danger that such a belief entails. We needed a community and a lan-
guage to support our own creative ventures, so we were willing to overlook 
the denial of creativity that was taking the form of cries of discovery. 
But it was a denial of creativity. As an illustration, consider the contri-
butions of Judy Grahn. Like all good feminist work, Grahn's scholarly ac-
tivity was not merely cognitive; it was a corporeal practice intended to 
change her own ways of living as a female body, and was offered to her read-
ers as an aid in our own woman-affirming practices. In "From Sacred Blood 
to the Curse and Beyond," Grahn explores the importance of menstrua-
tion for the prehistory of human society, a task she undertakes in part as a 
way to come to terms with her own femaleness and female bodily func-
tions. Since there is hardly any aspect of female embodiment that is more 
stigmatized in our culture than menstruation, as Beauvoir among others 
points out (Beauvoir 1989, especially 149-50), Grahn's choice of subject 
matter is extremely apt. Male commentators on the subject have typically 
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found it to be filthy and disgusting. In the not-so-distant past, women's 
descriptions were filled with comments resembling those typical mascu-
line judgments. Most girls-myself included-were taught to be ashamed 
of the function, to view it as compromising their standing as rational crea-
tures and competent citizens, and to hide it at least from males if not from 
everyone.6 No more than a generation or two ago, women regularly referred 
to it as "the curse." But far from being a painful curse, Grahn argues, men-
struation was originally the very wellspring of culture. It was because of 
menstruation that human beings "saw and learned to capture the concept 
of time" (Grahn 1982, 268). Further, "[b]y carving the moon cycles onto 
bone, by putting counting sticks into a basket, by tying knots in string, and 
by stringing beads in a particular manner to account for their own periods 
and the moon's, women created counting-and accounting" (Grahn 1982, 
268). She continues: "Without menstruation and the sciences of measure-
ment women developed from watching first the moon and then the stars, 
there would be no clocks or watches, no astronomers, no mathematicians 
or physicists, no astronauts, none of the architecture and engineering which 
have been born from exact measurement and proportion. We could build 
a nest, like a bird, but not a pyramid, not a square or rectangle or round or 
any other regular geometric shape. Geometry was a gift of menstruation" 
(Grahn 1982, 269). Indeed, Grahn implies, without this now degraded and 
hidden mammalian function, we would hardly be human at all. 
The thrust of Grahn's essay is not just that we need to find new ways to 
live and to value ourselves but that we need to recover the lost value of men-
struation as a way of recovering the true value of womanhood. By doing 
that, we will discover ways to live menstruation (and our lives as women) 
differently. Grahn relates in some detail the new knowledge of her own 
body that she acquired and the practices that she engaged in after she began 
to learn about the ancient meaning and importance of menstruation. The 
process oflearning about that prehistorical world where women's bodies 
were valued was life-transforming for her, as for other women she knows, 
and she hopes it will be life-transforming for her readers. She offers her 
scholarship as material for woman-affirming educational practices and 
suggests that women follow her lead in developing feminist rituals that cel-
ebrate womanhood by celebrating menstruation. 
Kay Turner, who has studied feminist rituals (including rites of passage 
like the ones Grahn mentions), maintains, "Feminist ritual offers an imag-
istic revitalization for women and participation in the concrete, bodily ex-
pressive creation of new images of the feminine ... " (Turner 1982,220 ). Not 
just menstruation rituals but also cleansing rituals, equinox rituals, dream-
sharing rituals, bonding rituals, and so on are important means, Turner ar-
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gues, of"connect[ing] the individual with the group-dramatically, indis-
solubly" (Turner 1982, 226). Rituals are practices that produce a sense of 
group identity and cohesiveness. But they are just as important for the health 
of individuals as they are for the health of the groups to which those indi-
viduals belong. Through ritual, according to Turner, "A lost self is recov-
ered, nurtured and allowed to emerge fully named" (Turner 1982, 231). 
Grahn and Turner both assume that part of what happens in feminist 
consciousness-raising, feminist scholarship, and feminist ritual-in all prac-
tices that are woman-affirming-is that women find their true identities, 
their true selves. Woman-affirmation involves not so much self-creation or 
self-formation as the recovery of a self that is already formed. This recov-
ery, or uncovering, can happen, they maintain, because through feminist 
activity women open spaces outside of patriarchal power, beyond the reach 
of the networks of power that define femaleness as inferior to maleness and 
impose hardship and shame upon women. This is why Turner asserts that 
feminist ritual in particular is a form of radical politics (Turner 1982, 222). 
Grahn and Turner and their compatriots such as Kathleen Barry and 
Mary Daly might be viewed as extreme essentialists quite unlike a good 
many of their contemporaries and certainly unlike the anti-essentialist 
postmodern feminists of the turn of this century.? But I don't think we can 
dismiss them that easily. The turn away from radical creativity and toward 
discovery that we see full scale in their work haunts all of feminism, I think, 
including postmodern theory. And I fear it will continue to haunt us as 
long as feminists yearn to affirm ourselves as an "us," as members of an 
identifiable class of people called "women." 
Yet what else are we to do? What is feminism about if it is not about peo-
ple identifiable as women? What is it, if it is not a way of discovering com-
monalities and gathering women together to achieve certain goals? If we 
embrace the unknown and experiment with creating forms of existence 
beyond the category of womanhood, in what sense is what we are doing 
"feminism" anymore? 
At this point I become extremely uneasy. What initially attracted me to 
feminism was its emphasis on moving beyond the present and the past-
including any kind of mythical past. The old Women's Liberation Move-
ment seemed to me to be about changing rules, loosening restrictions, 
opening doors, challenging traditions, and experimenting with personal 
styles and interpersonal relationships. It was a vigorous push outward, a 
breaking of bonds, a headlong rush out of confinement and into the world. 
It was not an inward-turning thing. It was leonine-ferociously destruc-
tive-and childlike-playful and creative. But of course, at the same time, 
it was also a product of its culture, a culture that resists with all its might 
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any turn away from the stasis of traditional identity, any move into the un-
known. Somehow that culturally pervasive resistance overcame iconoclas-
tic feminist momentum. Feminism gradually began to have an identifiable 
center: Woman-woman the victim of oppression, woman the subject and 
object of efforts to emancipate, woman the site of downtrodden virtue and 
righteous social change. Feminism came to be about recognizing that 
Woman and nurturing her as she recovered herself and took her destined 
place as the catalyst for a general, culturewide moral revolution. What had 
perhaps started out as a courageous journey into the unknown somehow 
got recast as a kind of enlightened return to origins. What I fear is that 
within feminism, such a turn is in some sense inevitable. 
I sincerely hope not, for I feel endangered in the movement of that re-
turn. In spite of all I may have gained through woman-affirming practices, 
I fear that in this re-centering movement I am being pulled back toward a 
way of thinking and living that I wanted to interrupt and re-form, back 
into a way of experiencing selfhood (and the world) that places stability 
over becoming and change, into a way of thinking that places knowledge 
over openness toward otherness and difference, toward that which eludes 
categorization. And this feeling doesn't dissipate completely when I read 
or work with anti-essentialist feminists. Underneath or alongside their 
ubiquitous critiques of essentialism I still detect a hint of the assumption 
that, despite it all and whatever happens, we are still women, and we can 
rest assured that nothing in feminism will compromise that. 
Through personal experience and through my study of Foucault's work, 
I am deeply aware of how dis-affirming such assumptions and insistences 
ultimately are for the kind of self that I am. And that brings me to Foucault 
and self- (as opposed to woman-) affirming practices. 
It has often been asserted that Foucault's early and middle works em-
body attempts to analyze political and social forces in the absence of sub-
jectivity, which would seem to mean that any kind of self-affirmative ges-
ture is impossible for Foucault. The first part of that assertion is true; 
Foucault did in fact say once in an interview that he wanted to develop a 
mode of analysis that did not rely upon a subject outside of history.8 But 
he never maintained that there is no such thing, at any given point in his-
tory, as human subjectivity of one sort or another. In Foucault's view, 
whether there is or is not some form of subjectivity at a given place and 
time is an empirical matter. In the periods Foucault studied, there were var-
ious kinds of subjectivity. In fact, it is these variations, together with the 
possibility of variation itself, that Foucault is most concerned with through 
much of his career.9 Foucault merely refuses to assume that subjectivity, 
selfhood, is foundational or ahistorical. Selves are historical creations, con-
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stituted within networks of power/knowledge relations; different networks 
of power/knowledge yield different types of self. Self-affirmation, then, is 
perfectly possible, but what sorts of practices are self-affirming depends 
upon what type of self one is. 
Foucault gives the name "normalization" to the power/knowledge net-
work that he believes is most prevalent in our society today. The selves that 
emerge within that network, various though they may be, are all normal-
ized selves. This does not mean that all selves are normal-far from it!-
or that all selves not deemed normal are constantly being subjected to treat-
ments to make them normal. In the most general terms, what it does mean 
is, simply, that who one is can be fully characterized (insofar as it can be 
characterized at all) in terms of norms and deviations from norms. In other 
words, in every aspect of my being-physical, intellectual, moral, you name 
it-I am a being in process, proceeding through stages of existence and 
functions of daily life at a rate and along a vector that can be measured and 
plotted against a norm. My individuality, insofar as it can be an object of 
knowledge (mine or others'), just amounts to the totality of my deviations 
from established norms. 
Normalization is what Foucault at an early stage in his career might have 
called a grid of intelligibility. It is a conceptual framework through which 
we view ourselves and others (both human others and nonhuman beings 
such as animals, plants, ecosystems, and human cultures). Since the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, Foucault tells us, we Westerners have learned 
to see all the world in terms of the category of development; all things de-
velop, and their more or less natural patterns and forces of development can 
be studied, normed, and to a great extent harnessed and directed by scien-
tific means. This way of seeing has institutionalized itself in disciplines such 
as psychology, criminology, sexology, biology, anthropology, pedagogy, and 
many other fields; as it has done so, it has permeated and to some extent re-
shaped the institutional settings where those disciplines are practiced: 
schools, hospitals, prisons, corporations, mental institutions, and social wel-
fare bureaus. Thus, it is not simply a grid of intelligibility, a network of 
knowledge; it is also a network of institutional practices, public policies, and 
in general the routine exercise of social and political power. It is a network 
of power/knowledge. 
On first hearing, many readers simply reject the idea that who an indi-
vidual is can be characterized and known entirely within the terms of nor-
malization. But in fact it is extremely hard to give any information about 
any person at all-oneself included-without referring to sets of norms. 
There is hardly any intelligible way to talk about our bodies without refer-
ring to norms; how tall a person is, how fit, how healthy-virtually any as-
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sertion you can make will refer to functional norms and established pat-
terns of human physiological development and decline. Further, most of us 
reflect upon and present our personal histories in terms of developmental 
norms. We employ the language of developmental psychology to account 
for our behavior, our feelings, our inclinations, our talents, and our prefer-
ences in terms of developmental norms together with influences on our de-
velopment that may have produced deviations from norms. In truth, most 
of us are quite comfortable with self-descriptions that rely upon established 
norms as reference points and may even feel slighted if our specific devia-
tions go unrecognized. We know and experience ourselves as normalized 
selves. And this is understandable, because within the power/knowledge 
networks that shape our social world, the only kind of self that is intelligi-
ble at all is a normalized self. There is no outside to normalization, Foucault 
says, meaning that normalizing power/knowledge networks are so perva-
sive that beyond them nothing is knowable. 
Many of Foucault's readers take these conclusions as cause for despair, 
for two reasons. First, if Foucault is right, our identities are all reifications 
of norms and/or deviations from norms and, as such, tie us to networks of 
power that use those norms to exploit and oppress us, as Foucault makes 
clear in detail. This is especially obvious with identities such as "the delin-
quent," "the homosexual," or "the at-risk schoolchild," but even the ap-
parently natural category "woman" is an identity founded upon a set of de-
velopmental norms stretching from fetal sex differentiation through 
childhood gender acquisition through adolescent self-image formation. 10 
To be a woman is to have passed through numerous stages of normed de-
velopment and hence to display the physical and psychic marks of that de-
velopmental process. To bear the identity "woman" is thus to be available 
to the institutions and disciplines that seek to direct and manage our de-
velopmental trajectories. A second reason many readers despair is that Fou-
cault seems to be telling us that, since we are normalized selves through and 
through with no residual essence, to attempt to dismantle the power/knowl-
edge networks that hold us in bondage in oppressive institutions and prac-
tices is self-defeating; dismantling normalization would amount to dis-
mantling our own conditions of possibility. What, then, is to be done? Aren't 
all our avenues for taking control of our lives and resisting oppressive in-
stitutions effectively blocked? How can we possibly care for ourselves under 
these circumstances? 
Foucault certainly does not minimize the dangers that we face. Anything 
we do will be risky. We cannot withdraw from a corrupt society into the apo-
litical security of ahistorical identities; that is an illusion, as separatist move-
ments of the 1970s demonstrated. By the same token, we cannot simply set 
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our historically produced identities aside, for we are the developmentally 
emergent beings that society takes us to be. We cannot attack the very basis 
upon which our being is constituted and expect to be unshaken in the pro-
cess. We risk ourselves, in our very being, no matter what we decide to do. 
Foucault, then, speaks of ubiquitous danger. Yet his analysis does not 
make me feel endangered in the way that feminist woman-affirming prac-
tices do. I am much less frightened by Foucault's harsh picture of the cur-
rent world than by Judy Grahn's or Kathleen Barry's optimistic exhorta-
tions to celebrate the recovery of a world and of selves we've supposedly 
lost. I don't recognize myself in their idyllic portrait of prehistorical wom-
anhood, or any other portrait of womanhood for that matter. I don't feel 
comfortable figuring positive changes in my self-understanding and mate-
rial comportment as a return to a reality obscured or lost. I can only think 
that positing a true or original womanhood to which we might return (to 
which we ought to be faithful?) will ultimately lead to (or at least play into) 
a defensive conservatism that fears creativity, difference, and change. Cre-
ative movements, differings, openness toward unmastered becoming will 
be suppressed, and those who embody and enact such movements will be 
oppressed within the same discourses and institutions that once held so 
much promise for freeing them. Within the terms of Foucault's analysis of 
normalization, however, I do recognize myself. I recognize myself as a self 
who, as "essentially" developmental, is "essentially" a phenomenon of be-
coming rather than of being. I recognize myself as a self who will always sur-
pass what I have been, who will never be identical with myself from mo-
ment to moment. I recognize myself as a being who will always exceed the 
boundaries of any identity. If I can find ways to affirm and care for that self, 
that developmental self who "by nature" defies final categorization, I can 
resist the oppressive aspects of normalizing networks of power (without 
positing a place beyond normalization). Normalization gives us ourselves 
as perpetually developing. Technologies of normalization then attempt to 
control the direction and rate of that developmental energy. We cannot defy 
normalization insofar as it gives us ourselves entirely, but we can resist and 
gradually perhaps dismantle normalizing technologies and disciplines. We 
can affirm ourselves as developing beings, ever-changing beings, while at 
the same time adopting disciplinary practices-techniques of caring for 
ourselves-that affirm the movement of our own becoming at the expense 
of predetermined vectors and norms. In other words, we can affirm our de-
velopmental freedom without affirming the existing technologies that would 
harness that self-differing energy. And then perhaps perpetual self-differing 
will become self-overcoming and will allow something new to emerge be-
yond oppressive normalization. 
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A primary danger that Foucault sees is the almost irresistible tempta-
tion to affirm not my self as developmental becoming but my identity as 
some reified stage of that developmental process. The danger is that we will 
refuse our selves in our movements of becoming by embracing static iden-
tities. When feminists call upon me to affirm my identity as a woman, be-
neath this joyful affirmation of carnal and specifically sexual existence I 
also hear a demand that I abandon my developmental self, call a halt to be-
coming other, deny my potential for change and hence for self-formation, 
and thus abandon both the care of myself and the practice of philosophy. 
What, by contrast, do I hear Foucault calling me to do? To affirm myself 
as a process of becoming, of becoming always other to what I have been, 
to find and cultivate practices that will militate against reification and thus 
place in question any identity's claim to timelessness. To take care of my-
self, in Foucauldian terms, is to foster an awareness of becoming, of oth-
erness, to hold myself open to an open future, to give myself over to what 
is not and cannot yet be known. 11 This, for a developmental self, is self-
affirmation; it requires the perpetual overcoming of identificatory cate-
gories. Care of the self, therefore, stands opposed to practices that affirm 
my identity as a woman. Practices of woman-affirmation stand opposed 
to affirmation of the free play of becoming, differing, and otherness. 
This brings me, rather abruptly, into the full scope of the terrible ten-
sion I feel when I try to situate myself in relation to my philosophical work 
and my feminist work simultaneously. If philosophy is a lifelong activity 
of self-formation, which implies that the self is not a static entity awaiting 
recovery, can I be both a philosopher and a feminist? 
I don't know. I want to say yes, because I know the creative power of the 
feminist practices that over the last twenty-five years produced me. But in 
all honesty, I'm not sure. That the way to an answer involves resolute liv-
ing through the tension, though, I have no doubt. It is through attempts at 
philosophical, ethical practice of feminism that an answer will constitute 
itself for each of us. 
This much is clear to me: If I am to continue to be a feminist, I have to 
find ways to rethink, but even more importantly to re-create, materially and 
bodily, both the concept and the experience of womanhood. One way to do 
that might be to learn to think woman not as a category of human being, 
not as an identity, but as the name for a locus of creative formation. 12 This 
would require first of all engagement in practices that would destabilize the 
category. If this were his project, Foucault would engage in genealogical 
scholarship, which is also an option for me. Reading (and teaching) the 
works of scholars who have produced partial genealogies of certain aspects 
of womanhood would surely be helpful-works like Elizabeth Badinter's 
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Mother Love and Thomas Laqueur' s Making Sex come to mind. I might also 
focus my attention on womanhood as a visual phenomenon and try to 
destabilize categorical thinking by challenging visual expectations. I can 
place myself in situations where my visual images of womanhood are dis-
rupted. These can be queer places-like bars that cater to mixed sex and 
transgender groups-or they can be all-female places-like gym locker 
rooms. In the former kind of place, obviously, it's hard to tell who is female 
(whatever that starts out meaning) and who is not, and after awhile I find I 
get numbed to the question and just put it aside. In the latter kind of place, 
femaleness ceases to be a distinguishing feature of anybody, so the huge va-
riety of what gets called female embodiment and comportment comes into 
full view.13 Maybe if the category woman is sufficiently destabilized and de-
centered, I could start working on ways to think woman as something other 
than a category, something more like a site of volatility. Affirmations of 
womanhood could then become not affirmations of a static presence or 
truth but rather affirmations of something precisely not fully present and 
not fully envisioned.14 
I have to acknowledge that for all its postmodern rhetorical correctness, 
I'm a little wary of this path-not the practices of category destabilization, 
which I engage in regularly, but the redefinition of womanhood beyond cat-
egorization.15 Although I believe such a thing is logically possible and even 
over time almost inevitable, such "solutions" offered hastily never sound 
like much more than some kind of verbal trick-like I could rectify all sorts 
of sexual injustices by just defining women as we know them/us out of ex-
istence. If women didn't exist, all kinds of important political issues (abor-
tion, job discrimination, rape) wouldn't exist either. But those issues do 
exist, and no mere verbal contortion is going to set them aside. Although I 
see the philosophical value of this approach and I know its goal is the very 
opposite of the kind of loss I fear, I still worry that without a lot of careful 
work it could reduce my feminist practice to some kind of esoteric exercise 
in theory production, to something that won't have much impact on most 
people's lives, including my own. And what's the point of that? After all, if 
feminism is important at all, it is because it is first of all about securing jus-
tice, recognition, protection, and material well-being for people who cur-
rently fit rather static definitions of femaleness taken as a natural kind.16 To 
do nothing more than just redefine feminism so as to leave out that kind of 
tough work is to skirt the most important issues. So one important ques-
tion I have to ask is: Is it possible to engage in that more traditional kind of 
feminist political practice (the nitty-gritty equal rights and equal protec-
tions kind) while embracing a de-categorized conception of woman as a 
locus of becoming? 
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Although such engagement would require reorientation in our political 
thinking and extensive reworking of our liberal rhetoric, I believe it is pos-
sible. I think I can embrace the idea that "woman" (whatever else it may be) 
is the name for an important site for the emergence of a future and argue 
effectively that those whose lives unfold at such sites must be protected, 
physically and legally, and their free becoming fostered. What is important 
is not the preservation of whatever "woman" is, 17 but the openness to the 
becoming that occurs as what woman is overcomes itself and surpasses it-
self toward an open future. I think political action could be grounded in 
something no more doctrinal and definite than that. I think I could do sig-
nificant political work on the strength of a belief in the importance of re-
sisting governmental, legal, economic, and cultural foreclosure of creative 
possibility. That path might be a very hard one to negotiate, but that is no 
reason to avoid taking it. 
Furthermore, some of the resources for developing such political strate-
gies already exist in some of the feminist practices I've already encountered 
and cultivated for many years. When I (along with so many other feminists 
in the 198os) was rethinking female bodies, was I not by so doing actually 
creating a new body for myself, a body that I now inhabit and enact? I think 
so, even if I and the feminists around me did not always recognize or ac-
knowledge the creative dimensions of what we were doing. And when we 
challenged masculine supremacy and authority, did we do so always in the 
name of some older truth that had a prior claim? I don't think so; I think 
we often did so in the name of difference and futurity rather than in the Ian-
guage of return. Sometimes we made assertions; we made truth-claims, and 
truth -claims almost always at least implicitly ally themselves with timeless-
ness, sameness, a present that does not change. But no matter what asser-
tions we might have made, insofar as our feminism was embodied in prac-
tices rather than in doctrines and propositions, it allied itself with history, 
contingency, and difference. Even Judy Grahn's practices affirm difference 
and change, despite the fact that the conclusions she draws from them deny 
contingency. We, I, need to acknowledge that implicit alliance between his-
tory, difference, and practice and make it explicit in all our political acts. 
Still, it remains to be seen whether the work we would undertake once 
these transformations had occurred would constitute something we would 
want to call "feminist." That work would certainly have feminism in its lin-
eage; it would certainly have been conditioned by a feminist past. But would 
it be feminist? If we truly do embrace the future as open and ourselves as 
women as historical existences, I don't think that question is answerable in 
advance. 
To conclude: I've said here that I believe, with Foucault, that philosophy 
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is not a body of doctrine or even a set of analytical techniques. It is a way of 
living, a pursuit that informs all our activities and is informed by all our ac-
tivities. It has been called pursuit of wisdom-which means that it is a kind 
of creative self-shaping, a kind of self-transformation that opens toward dif-
fering, toward the unmastered and the unknown. We normalized selves, fun-
damentally developmental and therefore perpetually transformative "in es-
sence," are particularly well suited to take up philosophy and even to do so 
both as a means of resisting oppressive normalizing technologies and as a 
means of caring for and affirming ourselves. Construed in this way, as Fou-
cauldian care of the self, can philosophy be feminist? Can feminism be phil-
osophical? I hope so. But, in the end, whether feminism can be philosoph-
ical or philosophy can be feminist are not issues that can ever be settled on 
paper. They can be resolved only in practice, by being enacted and incor-
porated. Therefore I must leave the question open here. It stands as a chal-
lenge to me and to all feminists and philosophers to make it so. That is, to 
live it so. 
NOTES 
1. See, for example, the introduction to The Use of Pleasure where Foucault writes, 
"I have benefited greatly from the works of Peter Brown and those of Pierre Hadot, 
and I have been helped more than once by the conversations we have had and the 
views they have expressed" (1985, 8). 
2. Hadot was Foucault's colleague for one year at the College de France, having 
taken the chair in the History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought in 1983. 
3· This is a temptation that a lot of good thinkers succumb to; they write an ex-
tremely influential book or set of articles, and then they spend the rest of their lives 
repackaging the same ideas in better and better ways. Not that there isn't value in 
doing that, but it is primarily a literary, not a philosophical, activity. 
4· See Embree (1970, 194-212) and Weisstein (1970, 228-45). 
5· Echols (1989, 5). Echols maintains that there is a distinction of note between 
radical feminism and cultural feminism, even though some of the same thinkers 
are prominent in both. I'm less sure of her distinction, but whether it is concep-
tually sound or not, the point remains that the work of the 1960s and early 1970s 
has a different thrust or at least is open to a different interpretation than the work 
that came after it. 
6. Beauvoir quotes several women's descriptions of their own extremely nega-
tive attitudes toward menstruation (1989, 310-14). 
7· See, for example, Barry: "We must look to our matriarchal past for guidance 
in defining a culture that is a logical extension of nature. With the essence of moth-
erhood and a sense of the preservation of life imprinted in our genes, matrilineal 
descent will naturally become the organization of the society we envision" (1973, 
25). See also, for example, Daly (1984). 
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8. Foucault (1980, 117): "I don't believe the problem can be solved by historicis-
ing the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that 
evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense with the constituent 
subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which 
can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And 
this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for 
the constitution ofknowledges, discourses, domains of object etc., without having 
to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field 
of events runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history." 
9. See, for example, Foucault's claim: "My objective, instead, has been to create 
a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects" (1983, 208). 
10. I have an unpublished paper on this subject entitled "Of or Pertaining to a 
Female," which I presented as a keynote address at Vanderbilt University's Philos-
ophy and Feminism conference in January 1999. 
11. For a great deal more detail about this notion of a self-overcoming selfhood, 
see McWhorter (1999, especially chapter 7). 
12. Much as we might think of the space formed by the interplay of Dionysus 
and Apollo in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. 
13. This doesn't work in same-sex spaces where people are particularly insistent 
upon a single image of their sex-like traditional baby showers or gyms where 
everyone is young and beautiful. The gym at my university is a good place to go 
because there are beautiful, slim, young women but also, since any employee can 
use the facility for free, there are older women with weight problems, women with 
injuries and disabilities, bull dykes with big muscles, and of course a number of 
anorexics. To categorize all these bodies and comportments as one type of human 
being, a type that overrides all other differences, seems ridiculous in that context. 
The more time I spend in that context, the less overriding the category "woman" 
comes to seem. I think Honi Haber is suggesting something like this tactic. See 
Haber (1996, 137-56). 
14. I take this path to be the one advocated by Judith Butler: "Identity categories 
are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary. This 
is not to say that the term 'woman' ought not to be used, or that we ought to an-
nounce the death of the category. On the contrary, if feminism presupposes that 
'women' designates an undesignatable field of differences, one that cannot be to-
talized or summarized by a descriptive identity category, then the very term be-
comes a site of permanent openness and resignifiability .... To deconstruct the 
subject of feminism is not, then, to censure its usage, but, on the contrary, to re-
lease the term into a future of multiple significations, to emancipate it from the 
maternal or racialist ontologies to which it has been restricted, and to give it play 
as a site where unanticipated meanings might come to bear" (1992, 15-16). 
15. As Foucault says, everyiliing is dangerous, and postmodernism is no exception. 
16. Even the personal changes I've described above required social and legal 
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change. It really wasn't enough for me to rethink my female embodiedness. Laws 
had to change to allow women to engage in activities previously unavailable or off-
limits to us. Attitudes of people around me had to change to accommodate my 
changes. There were communal forces at work in my feminist self-transformations, 
and those must not be overlooked or minimized. 
17. It is important, though, to acknowledge and contend with the various things 
that woman is, to work through them and possibly at times to redeploy them strate-
gically. We can't ignore the category. It does exist and have a very real place and 
impact. 
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